In this episode John discusses the issues faced by IDP's - Internally displaced people. He is a student journalist with us on a placement organised by War Studies Department, King's College, London. This article was edited by a fellow student journalist recently graduated from Oxford University Career Services.
🎧 listen to John's backstory here - he discusses his motivation & research as well.
Meeting the Challenge of Internal Displacement: the Relocation and Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria’s Borno State
The case of the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria’s Borno State. It illustrates the economic, social, and security related difficulties internally displaced persons (IDPs) face when reintegrating into their communities. Along with the underlying reasons for why authorities rush the process of reintegration at the expense of the persons affected. Borno state’s reintegration program. Which focused on the early closure of camps for the IDPs. It failed to take into account both the needs and the voices of the state’s IDPs. Resulting in ongoing humanitarian issues that seem likely to worsen soon.
Boko Haram – whose name usually translates as “western education is forbidden”. It is also known by its official name of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad. Or “people committed to the propagation of the teachings and jihad”. It preaches a fundamentalist version of Islam, opposing western influence in northern Nigeria. The group originates in 2002 in Borno’s capital of Maiduguri. Founded by Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher . Who had become radicalized after his exposure to Salafi Wahhabi ideas in Saudi Arabia. The group began peacefully. Attracting many recruits from the unemployed youth of northern Nigeria. Historically a poor and underdeveloped region. A political alliance with Borno’s governor Ali Modu Sheriff initially helped grow the group’s influence. But Sheriff then broke with Boko Haram. Leading to the group staging a violent uprising in 2009. While the revolt was quickly put down and Yusuf was killed. His successor Abubakar Shekau waged a guerilla insurgency. From 2014-2015 gained control over an estimated area of 20,000 square miles in Borno state. Boko Haram considers any Muslim not participating in Jihad to be a Takfir. Or infidel. Leading it to engage in wholesale massacres of civilian populations. While a military offensive reduced the group’s territorial control. It continues to seriously destabilize the north. Boko Haram’s splinter group ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), has pledged allegiance to the Islamic state. It is now considered to be the more dangerous of the two.
Boko Haram’s exceptional bloodthirstiness towards civilians contributed to large internal displacement in northern Nigeria. While ISWAP does not target civilians like Boko Haram. It is still extremely violent and has caused many Nigerians to flee their homes. As of January 2023, some 2.5 million Nigerians are internally displaced as a result of the conflict. With 1.8 million in Borno State alone; 500,000 of these are in Maiduguri (International Crisis Group).
Several factors compound the plight of IDPs. The foremost of these involves gender. As of 2021 women and girls made up 79% of people displaced by the conflict (The Conversation). Women in IDP camps have often been subject to sexual assault by security forces and camp officials. Or forced to engage in prostitution in exchange for food. Additionally, the government’s preexisting lack of resources to care for IDPs is compounded by the need to resettle refugees repatriated from Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Cameroon, for example, has 135,000 Nigerian refugees as of 2019. Thousands of these refugees have been repatriated, sometimes by force (UNHCR). The Tripartite Agreement for the Voluntary Repatriation of Nigerian Refugees, signed by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in March 2017 fails to make any provisions for women or girls.
These longer-term factors are exacerbated by Borno State Governor Babagana Umara Zulum’s plan to close IDP camps early. Zulum claimed that he sought to close the camps because the security situation in Borno State had improved. However, many areas to which IDPs were encouraged to return were very insecure. For example, militants killed 50 people during May 2022 attacks on the town of Rann. While the Nigerian military has engaged in artillery bombardments near the town of Bama (Human Rights Watch). Additionally, authorities have cited the alleged presence of drugs and “thuggery” in the camps. However, Zulum’s primary justification for closing camps appears to be the beliefs that reintegrating IDPs as soon as possible is necessary for regional stabilization. And that aid to IDPs by the government or NGOs will foster an unhealthy dependence. Zulum, who has promised to close all camps by 2026. He argues that is it particularly important for IDPs to return home from urban centers. Such as Maiduguri because many are farmers, herders, and fishermen who depend on their lands for their livelihood. (Source - International Crisis Group). Additionally, he has sought to bar NGOs. Which he accuses of driving up rents in Maiduguri. Also from working with IDPs who have returned to their original locations. Although humanitarian groups and UN agencies have still managed to work with returned IDPs in Monguno and Bama (ibid). Zulum’s policy appears to relate to Borno State’s 10 year Strategic Transformation Plan and 25 Year Development Framework. As of January 2023, 300,000 IDPs have been relocated (Amnesty.org).
Beginning in 2021, Zulum’s administration began shutting down refugee camps in Maiduguri. By August 2022, 140,000 IDPs from eight camps had been relocated. With 74,000 more from two others schedule to be relocated by the year’s end. Camp closures typically began with an early morning visit by the governor or his representatives. Who would hand out numbered cards to heads of households and wives to mark them as recipients as government support. Individuals were usually given 10-15 days to leave the camps. In at least one camp, authorities paid an initial visit. But never followed up to distribute money. Or assign departure dates leading to widespread confusion. Additionally, this approach to camp closures ignored the cases of unmarried IDPs. Who were not dependent on their families, and individuals who happened not to be present on the day of the visit. Moreover, no monitoring mechanism existed for the process (International Crisis Group).
Borno’s state government has also attempted to encourage IDP relocation. By drastically cutting funding to existing camps and offering IDPs money to resettle. While officially IDPs were presented with a choice. Some appeared to fear retaliation from the authorities if they did not leave. Adult men and widows were offered 100,000 Naira (approximately $230) to relocate. An amount significantly greater than the roughly $40 per month plus occasional food supplies they received in the camps. Yet, some IDPs only received an initial installment of $45. While others received nothing at all. Government efforts to aid the transport of IDPs to their home areas were also erratic. In some cases fees were charged to IDPs for assistance. While in other cases no transportation assistance was provided (Amnestry.org). Many IDPs found that even full relocation payments were often insufficient for their needs. With most spending the money within 2-3 months on rent, food, makeshift shelters, or transportation out of the camps (Human Rights Watch).
Many IDPs became distressed after the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the World Food Program ceased providing monthly rations and cash transfer for food. In the wake of the announcement that camps would begin closing – an announcement that came suddenly and with no explanation. SEMA would later provide occasional food deliveries to camps. But this was insufficient for many IDPs. Many of whom were forced to support themselves through menial labor often paying as little as 300-700 Naira daily ($0.52-$1.21) (ibid).
Many IDPs who leave Maiduguri’s official camps do not end up leaving the city. These IDPs often live in lower income areas or on vacant land. Often becoming dependent on private landowners. They often lack access to proper sanitation, healthcare, and drinking water. A situation that became particularly apparent during the Shuwari neighborhood’s cholera epidemic in October 2021. Which killed 21 children and 20 elderly IDPs (Amnesty.org). Without government aid and with only limited access to NGOs, many live in unsafe makeshift housing and tents created from tarpaulin, zinc, and thatch. Children sometimes resort to street begging, making them vulnerable to exploitation. (Human Rights Watch).
Due to security concerns. IDPs relocating outside of Maiduguri are often encouraged to move to garrison towns such as Baga, Doran Baga, Marte, and Cross Kawa. Even these areas are not always secure. In 2018, Borno State’s first resettlements sent IDPs to the towns of Kukawa and Baga. Only for them to be overrun by insurgents shortly afterwards. State authorities began collaborating with the UN and NGOs. Shortly thereafter to develop a new approach called the Borno State return strategy. In what the International Crisis Group described as a tacit admission of wrongdoing. However, these issues were repeated in November 2022. When ISWAP overran the village of Mallam Fatori, causing 6,000 IDPs to flee across the border into Niger. While Nigerian authorities claim that many regions are now safe for return. This is privately contested by officials off the record. Central and northern Borno, particularly the Sambisa forest, continue to witness high rates of militant attacks. Leading the state’s number of IDPs to actually increase in 2022 (International Crisis Group). NGOs and even the Nigerian military have repeatedly warned Governor Zulum that many areas are unsafe for resettlements. But these warnings have gone unheeded (Amnesty.org).
Resettled IDPs face economic challenges as well. Many are forced to make an income gathering firewood. Leaving them vulnerable to kidnapping by militants while working in the bush. Others knit caps for a living; those without this skill often become farmhands, working for $1.15-$1.80 a day. Many former farmers have returned to find their lands too dangerous to use. As a result, they often rent fields from landowners instead. Military curfews constrain both firewood gatherers and fishermen near Lake Chad. In one case an IDP was killed by security forces after returning past curfew and being unable to produce a token. Tensions between IDPs and the military are exacerbated by soldiers and members of the government sponsored Civilian Joint Task Force militia. “Taxing” farmers, herders and fishermen in exchange for allowing them to carry on with their trades. Some military officers have also set up farming and fishing operations. Employing IDPs for low wages and exporting the produce elsewhere because locals are too poor to purchase it. The military’s ban on dry fertilizers, which is sometimes used to make explosives, has furthered tensions. Moreover, relocated IDPs are prevented from bringing relatives or possessions with them when visiting Maiduguri. NGOs often had a difficult time reaching these IDPs. In part due to the government’s lack of cooperation and in part due to ISWAP’s aggressive attitude toward aid workers. Who it considers to be “crusaders” (ibid).
Should Borno State’s current IDP policy continue. There is a serious risk that IDPs may return to insurgent controlled areas in search of better economic opportunities. There is evidence that fishermen in the Lake Chad islands have already done this to be closer to better fishing grounds. This danger is further fueled by incidents of military violence against civilians. Such as the burning of Kukawa’s market by security forces. Or the Nigerian Air Force’s attack on fishermen casting nets in Lake Chad in 2022. It is also possible that the current IDP policy could create conflicts over land rights. Both between returning IDPs, the military and between farmers and herders seeking to use the same land. An echo of the ongoing herder-farmer conflict in Zamfara and northwestern Nigeria (ibid).
To mitigate these risks and ease the ongoing humanitarian crisis involving IDPs. Borno State must end its closures of IDP camps. Repair its relationship with NGOs by allowing their access to resettled IDPs. And providing better resources for those IDPs who have already relocated. Lastly, Borno State’s government should work to establish channels by which IDPs can safely communicate their needs and complaints to authorities without fear of reprisal. In so doing, Borno State can make progress toward its goal of stabilization by building a deeper trust with dislocated populations.
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