Noel is a member of the War Studies Department at King’s College, London. He wrote this piece as part of her internship with Arts4Refugees. His motivation was to help his peer group understand the unique experiences of post-conflict communities. This article was edited by Cassia Jefferson, a fellow student journalist from Oxford University. Bernadett from Swinburne University interviewed Noel for the podcast as well.
Backstory podcast
Post-Genocide Rwanda: A case of successful reconciliation?
2023 marks the 29th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide. Occuring in 1994 over the course of 100 days, it is estimated that upwards of 800,000 people were killed, the vast majority of whom were Tutsi civilians. This article will examine what Rwandan society looks like today in the aftermath of this devastation. Have the Hutus and Tutsis adjusted to their new lives together, or are there still tensions between the groups?
What is Reconciliation?
Reconciliation holds many meanings for different people depending on their perspectives. However, it is widely agreed that it is not a single event, but an ongoing process. This article relies on the concept of “reconciliation” presented by John Paul Lederach, who defines it as a process that draws upon truth, justice, mercy and peace to overcome trauma, build trust and develop a lasting end to conflict (Malek and Burgess, 2013). Under this definition, simply ending violence or achieving a political settlement does not achieve true reconciliation, as underlying conditions and causes which lead to conflict must be addressed. This process can involve acknowledging past injustice, mercy, addressing inequalities and collaboratively building a new shared vision for the future.
How do we measure the success of reconciliation?
We can measure the success of reconciliation by examining Lederach’s definition alongside Johan Galtung’s concept of Positive Peace. Galtung argues that the goal of peacebuilding is to create an environment free of physical and structural violence and eliminate discrimination. This helps to form a new social equilibrium between groups with mechanisms to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence and war. Based on this, we can measure the success of the Reconciliation process in Rwanda by exploring if truth, justice, mercy and peace are present in the nation today, and if they have created a society which has resolved the issues that led to the initial conflict.
Background of the Rwandan Genocide:
The Rwandan Genocide was the climax of the Rwandan Civil War which occurred between 1990 and 1994. It was the culmination of years of tensions and injustices between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda, fueled by political, economic, and social factors that were further exacerbated by colonialism. While the Belgians were not the first to colonise modern-day Rwanda, they played a key role in laying the foundations of the conflict. The Belgian Colonial Administration introduced identity cards which denoted your specified ethnicity. This divided the Rwandan people into two groups based on arbitrary factors, although the Hutus and the Tutsis shared a common language and had similar traditions (Human Rights Watch, 2023). This institutionalised social hierarchies and allowed for widespread racial discrimination. The Colonial Administration also disproportionately favoured the Tutsis (Jones, 2001), and gave them a range of advantages over the majority Hutus, such as access to higher education and positions of power within government. This led to the disenfranchisement of the Hutu, who felt unfairly discriminated against and excluded, thus escalating tensions. After the decolonization of the nation, the Hutu gained political control over Rwanda. They enacted similar discriminatory practices against the Tutsi, excluding them from political and economic opportunities in their newly independent nation (Jones, 2001). For example, the Hutu introduced an ethnic quota system where the Tutsi were only permitted 9% of available public service jobs (Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, n.d.), which severely limited their representation and political participation. The ruling Hutu elite also used propaganda to unite the Hutu groups and incite anti-Tutsi sentiment by blaming them for the country's problems. Dominant narratives portrayed the Tutsi as foreigners, wealthy oppressors, and threats to national security. This continued to increase tensions between the two groups and led to the formation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) by Tutsi refugees in exile alongside Hutu extremist groups who believed the Tutsi threatened Hutu dominance and freedom, drawing on fears which were amplified by state media. Thus, the stage was set for the Rwandan Civil war in 1990.
What did reconciliation in Rwanda look like?
Following the end of the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide, the new government of Rwanda under the leadership of President Paul Kagame faced the task of reconciling their divided society. They established several mechanisms, such as the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), the Gacaca Court System and complied with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These all aimed to uncover the truth and build a common shared narrative regarding the events surrounding the Rwandan genocide (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 1999). The Rwandan Government saw this as essential to reconciliation in accord with the Truth, Justice and Mercy aspects of Lederach’s Reconciliation Process.
The NURC focused on fact-finding, and played a vital role in gathering testimonies from survivors and perpetrators alike. It aimed to promote dialogue, understanding, and empathy between the Tutsi and Hutu people by creating a comprehensive narrative of the events that unfolded during the genocide. This was achieved by facilitating open discussions and providing platforms for victims to safely share their stories. The NURC hoped this would create a common understanding that aimed to foster healing, thus fulfilling the “Truth” element of Lederach’s concept of Reconciliation.
The ICTR was established to hold the perpetrators of the genocide accountable and provide justice to the victims and their families. Alongside this, the Gacaca courts and traditional community tribunals addressed lower-level crimes committed during the genocide with a focus on restorative justice. The Gacaca courts facilitated dialogue between victims, perpetrators, and the wider community. Perpetrators were given an opportunity to confess their crimes, express remorse, and seek forgiveness from the survivors and their communities. This helped to provide closure for the victims and their families, empowering them to move forward with their lives and forgive other perpetrators, which was essential to a successful reconciliation. The combined system of the ICTR and Gacaca Courts can be seen as fulfilling both the “Justice” and “Mercy” components of Lederach’s concept of Reconciliation.
Was Reconciliation in Rwanda successful?
While significant progress has been made in healing relations between the Hutu and Tutsi, there are several issues with its implementation.
Firstly, there are credible allegations of miscarriages of justice (Haskell, 2011) in both the ICTR and Gacaca Court system. These question whether the equal application of justice was carried out sufficiently to contribute to reconciliation. For example, despite the RPF forces being responsible for killing an estimated 60,000 civilians throughout Rwanda (Jones, 2001) the ICTR was unwilling to prosecute RPF forces for acts of violence against Hutus (Cascais, 2019). No cases against the RPF were brought to the ICTR (Human Rights Watch, 2014a). The Gacaca Courts also lacked consistent standards, with trial outcomes varying widely (Human Rights Watch, 2015) between different areas and people, even when the crimes were similar in nature. This was partly because judges involved with the Gacaca system received limited training and often had little to no formal education, leaving them inexperienced and ill-equipped for their role (Haskell, 2011). Additionally, due to the sheer number of cases and limited resources, the process has been slow and complex, leading to challenges in providing closure for all. Up to 10,000 of those accused died in captivity without receiving a trial (BBC, 2019). This left victims on both sides feeling that they have been denied justice, affecting their perceptions of the other side and their ability to reconcile with one another.
Secondly, Kaganme’s government has not adequately addressed the interethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis which were a foundation of the conflict. Instead, the government has chosen to suppress these divisions with laws aimed at erasing ethnic belonging by treating all citizens as a singular “Rwandan” ethnicity. However, Rwandans are still self-identifying as Hutu or Tutsi and this effort to remove references to ethnicity has simply pushed ethnic discussions below ground. This has also obscured the actual state of race relations within Rwanda, preventing dialogue between groups and “thick” reconciliation from developing (Sentama, 2022). Furthermore, socio-economic inequalities along ethnic lines continue to persist, posing a significant risk of conflict remerging which would disrupt ongoing reconciliation efforts.
Additionally, the authoritarian government continues to use its monopoly on violence to silence critics, reporters and political opponents both within and outside their borders (Human Rights Watch, 2014b; 2017; 2019a; 2019b; 2021). This suggests that structural violence remains present within Rwanda, conflicting with Johan Galtung’s concept of Positive Peace and therefore limiting the success of reconciliation efforts.
Conclusion
Rwanda has taken clear steps towards achieving a more complete reconciliation than that seen in other conflict zones such as Israel-Palestine or Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this process has been tainted by unequal applications of justice and mercy, and authoritarian measures to force unity and obscure race relations. Therefore, although Rwanda has made substantial progress compared to other post-conflict societies and the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer 2020 suggests high levels of reconciliation (over 90%), this paper cannot assert that reconciliation has been achieved entirely.
Reference list
BBC (2019). Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter. BBC News. [online] 4 Apr. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506.
Cascais, A. (2019). ICTR: A failed tribunal for genocide victims and survivors. [online] Deutsche Welle. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/ictr-a-tribunal-that-failed-rwandan-genocide-victims-and-survivors/a-51156220.
Haskell, L. (2011). Justice Compromised | The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts.
Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (n.d.). Rwanda: 1994 | Life before the Genocide. [online] Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. Available at: https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/rwanda/life-before-the-genocide/.
Human Rights Watch (2014a). Rwanda: Justice After Genocide—20 Years On. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years.
Human Rights Watch (2014b). Rwanda: Repression Across Borders. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders.
Human Rights Watch (2015). Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing Its Doors. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closing-its-doors.
Human Rights Watch (2017). Rwanda: Post-Election Political Crackdown. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/29/rwanda-post-election-political-crackdown.
Human Rights Watch (2019a). Rwanda: Disappearances Require Credible Investigations. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/15/rwanda-disappearances-require-credible-investigations.
Human Rights Watch (2019b). Rwanda: Killing Is Latest Attack on Opponents. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/24/rwanda-killing-latest-attack-opponents.
Human Rights Watch (2021). Rwanda: Arrests, Prosecutions over YouTube Posts. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/30/rwanda-arrests-prosecutions-over-youtube-posts.
Human Rights Watch (2023). History (HRW Report - Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999). [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm.
Jones, B.D. (2001). War and Genocide: History of the Rwandan Conflict. In: Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.19–43.
Malek, C. and Burgess, H. (2013). Reconciliation. [online] Beyond Intractability. Available at: https://www.beyondintractability.org/coreknowledge/reconciliation.
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (1999). NURC: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission: NURC Background. [online] Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Available at: http://197.243.22.137/nurc7/index.php?id=83.
Sentama, E. (2022). National Reconciliation in Rwanda: Experiences and Lessons Learnt. San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute.
Thank you for reading an A4R 🎨 Post. Don’t forget to share it with your friends and family.


