Post-conflict refugee radicalisation in the United Kingdom
The global conflict post-9/11 is markedly different from the 20th century, particularly regarding terrorism. What was once rare and irregular now seems common in Europe. The past decade has seen truck attacks in Nice, Barcelona, Berlin, and Volnovakha, bombings in Brussels and Manchester, and bombings and mass shootings in Paris, as well as shootings in Hannu, Munich, and Île-de-France.
In the UK, we've had recent attacks such as the Dover firebomb, Liverpool Women’s Hospital bombing, David Amess murder, 2020 Reading stabbings, 2020 Streatham stabbings, 2019 London Bridge stabbings, 2018 Westminster car attack. Before the Manchester Arena bombing, we had Jo Cox and Lee Rigby murders, attempted murder of MP Stephen Timms, and 7/7 bombings in London. There were also foiled attempts like the Ricin plot, the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, and a failed 2008 Exeter suicide bombing.
There is a demonstrable increase in far-right extremism in the UK. "Religious terrorism has been on the rise over the past 30 years,” especially radical Islamic terrorism. The background of the radical Islamic terrorist in Europe has changed over the past two decades. It was assumed that most terrorists were from well-educated, middle-class or high-income families”, like the 9/11 hijackers and the London subway and bus bombers. These terrorists tended to be second or third-generation immigrants who grew up in the West. However, “the number of converts involved in fundamentalist and radical Islamist networks has been growing since the early 1990s,” and so has the number of first-generation terrorists.
Between 2014 and 2018 in Europe, “almost 1,000 people have been injured or killed in terrorist attacks involving asylum seekers or refugees”. In fact, “44 refugees or asylum seekers have been involved in 32 Islamist terror plots in Europe, leading to 814 injuries and 182 deaths”.
This is a deeply troubling number for every European country. In 2016, “worldwide displacement hit an all-time high, with over 60 million people fleeing war and persecution”. This number has increased, especially after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, and significant influxes of post-conflict refugees in Europe and the UK. "International migration is driven by political violence, armed conflict, state repression, economic, and environmental factors. This migration is likely to grow due to climate change and loss of employment opportunities from globalization."
The UK has been worried about Islamic radicalism for some time, especially after attacks in Germany and France. As far back as 2005, “a classified MI5 document discussed a "home-grown Islamic insurgency" and its effects on the UK’s Muslim population. The UK has a ‘Prevent’ strategy, where the government intervenes in terrorism at an early stage and identifies those "vulnerable" to terrorism. The government aims to find those at risk and stop radicalization. Statistical data shows a growing number of attacks involve refugees, with 16 percent of Islamist plots in Europe involving asylum seekers or refugees over the past four years. Therefore, it's important to understand the problems refugees face and what causes radicalization.
What issues do post-conflict refugees face in the UK?
To understand the radicalisation pathway of asylum seekers and refugees (ASR), we first need to look at some statistics. Some argue the UK has an illegal immigration problem. “In the year ending September 2023, 45,081 detected irregular arrivals to the UK occurred, down 16% from the year ending September 2022, 83% arriving via small boats." The Home Office said its priority was “to stop the boats,” while "More than 100,000 people have come to the UK by this route since 2020”. These post-conflict refugees come from war-torn regions with few possessions, suffering from ill health and ill-treatment. Many have traveled for months, some years, faced abuse, and suffer from mental health issues, usually PTSD.
Many refugees come from Muslim backgrounds in the Middle East. According to the Pew Research Center, “of the 1.6 million people who received refugee status in Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 (or are expected to have their applications approved). More than three-quarters (78%, or 1.3 million) were estimated to be Muslims. These people most likely didn’t want to make the dangerous journey to Europe; they were moving against their will. According to the shared international definition, they are:
"An individual who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or, who, not having a nationality or being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.
Once refugees arrive in the UK, they face ostracization that's hard for Brits to grasp. For instance, "Certain media sections have headlined the social consequences of ASRs securing jobs, depriving locals of opportunities. But failure to secure jobs leads to headlines emphasizing their economic drain on housing, social services and benefits”. This catch-22 makes their lives harder. Media portrayals of ASRs, especially in right-wing tabloids, focus on stereotypes and “negative representations.”
For those who obtain asylum, “they have 28 days to leave government-provided accommodation. To receive welfare benefits, they need a national insurance number, which can take up to 28 weeks to process. These are people who fled war zones and are destitute, mostly Muslim, seeking comfort among other Muslims. Their existence is marred by scrutiny. The residential pattern of ethnic minority groups, specifically non-white Muslims, is the focus of integration and housing policy due to anxieties that clustering breeds social ills like terrorism. These refugees have arrived in Europe only to be shunned.
What problems do European Muslims face?
“Europe's difficulty in absorbing and assimilating its Muslim populations— not just immigrants, but also those whose parents and even grandparents were born on European soil—has left many Muslims without a sense of belonging or any clear identity”.
Researchers of Islamic terrorism and radicalisation rarely agree on radicalisation pathways, influences, Islam's role, or the usefulness of the term "radicalised," causing difficulty in understanding its causes. However, a well-agreed trend is the ‘othering’ effect a pre-radicalised individual feels, stemming from the human need for community. Those pushed away or shunned still seek community, potentially falling in with the wrong crowd due to integration difficulties or perceived injustice or discrimination.
Cultural differences between Western liberalism and Islam can provoke exclusion in Muslims, not just first-generation post-conflict refugees. Many second-generation Muslims find that “the manner in which the ideology of Islamism addressed the profound conflict they faced in adjusting to the incompatible demands of a plural and diverse British modernity and the traditional requirements of their kin and ethnic attachments” had pushed them away from Western ideals and into Islam.
The Home Office states that Muslims were the most common victims of hate crimes last year, “with over 3,000 Islamophobic incidents in England and Wales”. This is damning, as a “feeling of confidence that the legal system provides justice and fair process is central to a sense of belonging and inclusion in a society”, but the amount of crime the Muslim community away from the Police. BBC News reported "2,010 Islamophobic incidents between 7 October and 7 February - a steep rise from the 600 recorded the year before" due to the Israel-Hamas war. A 2015 study titled ‘Evidence-Based Policing of U.K. Muslim Communities: Linking Confidence in the Police With Area Vulnerability to Violent Extremism' found that “ethnic minority Muslims” had lower confidence in police than any other group. Hate crime incidents also fluctuate with news about Islamic Terrorism attacks. In 2007, Scotland Yard “published figures showing an increase in faith-hate crimes following the London bombings”.
9/11 and the 7/7 bombings influenced British perceptions of Muslims. A 2007 survey “of global opinion found that many Westerners see Muslims as fanatical, violent and intolerant, while many Muslims have an aggrieved view of the West... Other polls show that between 48 and 66 per cent of British Muslims feel that relations between Muslims and non-Muslims had deteriorated since 11 September 2001”.
British Foreign Policy in the past two decades has “played a significant role in British Muslim alienation”. What has exacerbated the damage to Muslim identity is “the perceptions developed since the commencement of the war on terror. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005 have placed a heavy burden on British Muslims. In the approaches adopted both in the media and often in political rhetoric, Muslims find their loyalties tested. They are made to renounce violence and terrorism more than any other minority group”.
When it comes to post-conflict Muslim refugees in the UK, the culture of ostracise and scrutiny, which can act as a “prime driver of radicalisation”, from “economic, social and cultural life”, can act as a life”. This pushed into the ideology of Ne’er-do-wells. These radicalised Islamic extremists want to inject “a state of terror in the minds of particular persons”. They have a warped view of reality that “promotes a non-negotiable, apocalyptic terms”. They are anti-Western-decadence and use violence to spread their goal.
Factors contributing to refugee radicalisation?
How do post-conflict Muslim refugees become believers of ‘radical Islam’? This is a tricky question, with some questions. “The precise trigger for primarily young males between 18–35 to follow the path of jihad remains unclear. There is no single profile of the Islamist terrorist”. What we do know is that “support for terrorism is stronger among those who see democracy as unsuitable for Muslim societies”. And the standard profile is “Male, Early to mid-20s, From the Middle East, likely Syria or North Africa, and More likely to be an asylum seeker than given refugee status.”
What most scholars agree upon is that social exclusion pushes people away from society and into new groups, which can be positive or damaging. Jihadists usually form small groups of self-radicalised individuals and engage in bonding exercises before committing a terrorist act”. These are people who require a sense of belonging after upheaval and are shunned in the place they seek refuge. Radical Islam offers recruits an explanation and solution to their plight, a mix of violence and anti-Western sentiment. Forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman studied 172 self-proclaimed jihadists and found that “80% were “cultural outcasts living at the margins of society,” as unassimilated immigrants in non-Muslim countries.”
This isn’t to excuse the heinous actions of Islamic extremists. But "someone at ease with their identity is less vulnerable to radical or extremist views after conversion.” Radicalization isn't just about being an outcast, but the "sense of ostracization...combined with repressive parental attitudes, restive community approaches towards legal and social norms, provide a recipe for rebellion or radicalization”. To view radicalisation as just a product of vulnerability “risks misunderstanding the terrorist problem and deflecting from a principle tenet of terrorism studies—terrorism involves rational and calculated violence."
What does this mean for National Security?
This means that “radicalisation isn't an 'Us' and 'Them' issue. States are involved in the process. How they respond to threats and the policies they adopt can make a difference. The UK tried multiculturalism, embracing the cultural diversity of Europe, including Muslim immigrant communities. But the policy resulted in tolerating beliefs and practices at odds with European values. Scholars agree that the current approach has ingrained identity crises into Muslim immigrants, at risk of joining radical Islamic networks and bred anger in native Europeans. To protect national security, the UK needs to promote authentic and positive integration of cultures, while understanding the problems faced by Muslim immigrants and Muslims in the UK.
The UK needs to understand that for Muslim youth, the social, sociological, and political environment has led to disillusionment, despondency, and identity crises. There's resentment towards Muslim refugees blamed for community woes. The UK needs to stop radical Islamic groups from being the sole source of “money, protection, purpose, and belonging for these people. For radicalised individuals, a lack “of rehabilitation programs means they'll continue to pose a threat, and putting them back into a society that hasn't addressed social problems and inequalities” will worsen the issue.
"Many of Europe's Muslims believe Islam is compatible with secular and liberal democracy and basic civil liberties”. The problem is we don’t show this to post-conflict refugees. “It's not possible to counter a powerful ideology without offering a better one”. The UK has an obligation to change how it treats these people for everyone’s safety.
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In this episode Felix discusses issues of post conflict radicalisation and its impact on the UK. He is a student journalist with us on a placement organised with the Department of War Studies, King's College, London. This article was edited using Lex.page. Image created with Napkin.Ai
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